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Félix Peña** 
 
Latin American Integration in a World and Region with New Realities 
 
The three most relevant features of current developments in the strategy of Latin American 
integration are the multiplicity of the various countries’ fields of action at both the global and 
regional levels; the crises and attempts at renewal at institutional bodies, especially Mercosur and 
the Community of Andean Nations (CAN in Spanish); and a heavy accent on the political and at 
times even ideological dimension. 
 
To some extent these issues reflect the impact of the dynamics of change that have emerged in 
recent years on the international scene, with the growing power of new players (China and other 
emerging economies), new and sensitive issues (energy, bio-fuels, climate change and others) and 
also new factors on the international and even domestic security agendas. 
 
These changes have left all countries –or at least those willing to take advantage of the new reality, 
including those of Latin America– open to multiple options that are not mutually exclusive, 
especially with regard to foreign trade, international investment and the sources of technical 
progress. In this framework, the old classifications of North-South and South-South in international 
economic relations show clear signs of being outdated, both in their validity for diagnosis and for 
action on the global scene by each country and its companies. 
 
The aforementioned features also stem from an international economic context that has been 
favourable –at least so far– for most Latin American countries. They are also the result of the 
region’s being somewhat removed from the main issues that dominate the agendas –especially 
economic and security– of the major powers that traditionally wield influence in Latin America, in 
particular the US and the EU, and for this reason the region also misses out on these countries’ 
political energies. 
 
To a certain extent it can be argued that today the fate of each country in the region is in its own 
hands. In other words, it depends on the quality of its strategies, policy and organisation, both 
domestic and external. In particular, China’s interest in the region has helped develop a spirit of 
international economic competition in some countries. They are using the phenomenon of 
globalisation to their favour by learning to harness its effects and take advantage of the 
opportunities it provides. 
 
This explains the perception of a certain return to obsolete ideas suggested by recent approaches 
and rhetoric that are reminiscent of the waging of crusades against the external sources of problems 
afflicting each Latin American country. And it can also explain the growing interest in China’s 
break with its ideological past, following the radical shift that Deng Xiao Ping imposed on the 
mobilisation of social energy in his country: he moved from the fight against capitalism and 
imperialism to the battle for development and modernisation. His famous remark, ‘what difference 
does it make what colour a cat is so long as it catches mice’, reflects a strategy of international 
insertion, far removed from ideological or religious fundamentalism. These are two opposing 
perspectives for diagnosing the room for manoeuvre that each country derives today from the 
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increasingly multipolar international system and, therefore, of the competition for power and the 
world’s markets. 
 
But to a large extent these features also reflect realities that are very much intrinsic to today’s Latin 
America. 
 
Without trying to provide an exhaustive list we can note the following factors, while allowing for 
the fact that sometimes they might manifest themselves in different ways as they are viewed in the 
perspective of each country: 
 
• The presence of opposing visions on the Latin American countries’ insertion in the world, both 
among the various countries and on their own internal fronts, with tendencies in some cases 
towards an approach closer to that of Deng Xiao Ping and in others marked more by elements 
characteristic of ideological fundamentalism –be they of the left or right– to take on categories 
also subject to revisionism with regard to their capacity to help understand the realities of the 
different countries of Latin America. 
 
• A combination of ideological affinities among various governments and at the same time, 
conceptual differences over the meaning of the strategic idea of integration and perhaps over the 
construction of democracy, the overcoming of all forms of social fracture and insertion in the 
world. 
 
• A differentiated perception of the concrete opportunities and challenges that the new 
international reality presents for each country, as well as acknowledgement that they are not 
necessarily similar in all cases and that there is not always the same capacity or margin of action 
for taking advantage of them. 
 
• The renewed regional protagonism of Venezuela, including its recent incorporation into 
Mercosur. 
 
• Dissatisfaction, sometimes acute, with accumulated experiences in some processes of 
integration. 
 
• The growing role that energy has in the respective agendas of relevant economic issues. 
 
• The presence of old (carry-overs from the War of the Pacific in the 19th century) and new 
situations of bilateral conflict (differences between Argentina and Uruguay on possible 
pollution from industrial projects along the banks of a river they share, or, with another scope 
and intensity in its manifestations, between Paraguay and Brazil over financial issues involving 
the mixed-capital company Itaipú). 
 
All of this is giving a new relevance to the classic integration-fragmentation tension between 
countries that share an international subsystem based on geographical continuity. Even an incipient 
arms race could be viewed as the reflection of a return to the opposite of what the strategic idea of 
regional integration actually means. Building a region that is open to the world, one in which 
centripetal forces win out over centrifugal ones and in which there is room for many kinds of 
diversity, is perhaps in Latin America –and other regions of the world– a great challenge that will 
require a strong strategic vision and political leadership. 
 
But it will also require a prominent role for civil society and much creativity in the area of 
methodology and integration techniques. At the same time it will call for prudence and political 
vision from the main external players with current or potential interests in the region, especially the 
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US, the EU and some of its member states, and also China. This paper only seeks to makes a few 
observations to help understand what is happening with Latin American integration and its 
prospects for the future, keeping in mind the new realities of global politics and economics. 
 
The Varied Mosaic of Latin American Integration 
 
In Latin America today there is no formal process of deep integration that encompasses or seeks to 
encompass all the countries of this geographical region. For the purposes of our analysis, by deep 
integration we mean that which is reflected in the development of a regional public asset, made up 
of joint institutions and policies among a group of countries. In a given geographical space, this 
allows for creation of common rules, social networks and symbols that citizens identify with the 
shared region. The effect of all this is to link in a potentially permanent way a group of sovereign 
nations and neighbours without necessarily reaching a new autonomous entity of power within the 
international system. 
 
At least for the foreseeable future, it does not seem likely that such a process of integration will 
develop in all of Latin America, at least with an intensity similar to that of European integration. To 
the contrary, what is more likely is a hardening of the current framework of fragmentation and 
differentiation among existing, differing processes of integration. This could even turn out to be 
positive, keeping in mind the many options open on the global stage and each country’s possibilities 
for developing multi-polar strategies for international insertion. 
 
Compared with the more homogeneous framework of integration in Europe, especially in the wake 
of successive enlargements of the European Union, the Latin American model is a varied mosaic. 
To some extent the Asian model of integration1 might be more useful than the European one for 
orienting reading of and any prospective analysis of what is happening or might happen in the field 
of Latin American integration. 
 
One of the institutions that takes in part of the Latin American geographical space is the so-called 
Rio Group. Its last meeting was held March 2-3 of 2007 in Turkemen, Guyana. It is a forum for 
dialogue and political agreement. But its goals do not necessarily include a process of deep 
integration. The Latin American Integration Association (ALADI in Spanish)2 is perhaps the 
institution that comes closest to a broad approach calling for a process of commercial integration. It 
is the successor of the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC), created in 1960 through 
the Treaty of Montevideo and replaced in 1980 by another Treaty of Montevideo, which created 
ALADI. 
 
Although ALADI is now composed of 12 countries, of which 10 are South American (the other two 
are Mexico and Cuba), not only does it not include countries participating in integration processes 
in Central America and the Caribbean, but in practice its specific commitments deal mainly with 
developing trade, especially preferential trade, among its member states. However, if it eventually 
managed to achieve its current goal of creating a free trade area, ALADI could boost its potential 
for contributing to trade and economic integration throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 
Most countries of Latin America and the Caribbean participate as full members of four sub-regional 
integration processes. In order of their founding, they are the Central American Integration System 
(SICA),3 the Caribbean Community (CARICOM),4 the CAN5 and Mercosur.6 Of the Latin 
                                                 
1 Piero Penetta (2003), Il Regionalismo Multipolare Asiatico: Contributo al Diritto della Cooperazione 
Istituzionalizatta fra Stati, Torino. 
2 For information on ALADI, including a programme of activities for 2007, is available at www.aladi.org. 
3 Information on Central American integration at www.sgica.org and www.sieca.org.gt. 
4 Information at www.caricom.org. 
5 Information at www.comunidadandina.org.  
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American countries with greatest relative economic weight, there are two which stand out by not 
belonging to any sub-regional plan, at least as full-blown members: Mexico and Chile. 
 
Mexico7 is a signatory of the North American Free Trade Agreement (ALENA in Spanish and 
NAFTA in English).8 From a geographical standpoint, as well as in terms of trade and investment, 
Mexico is a key part of North America. This is no impediment to its multipolar insertion in the 
global economy –with its own network of free trade agreements, with parties including the EU and 
in the Latin American region– with it role as a founding member of ALADI and growing flows of 
trade and in particular investment, even with preferential agreements, with the countries of Central 
America, the Caribbean and in particular South America. 
 
Chile,9 meanwhile, has stressed developing a model for multipolar insertion in the global economy. 
This is reflected in a wide range of free trade agreements, the most recent of which it signed with 
China. Highlights of these accords are the ones Chile has signed with the US and the EU. Unlike 
Mexico, its foreign trade and flows of direct foreign investment are more diversified in different 
regions of the world. With its geography and history, Chile is essentially a South American country. 
It is in this geographic region where it has significant political and economic interests. It has been 
and is destined to continue being a key player in defining the tension between the ideologies of 
integration and fragmentation that are typical of any international sub-system and increasingly 
evident in South America. 
 
In recent years, processes of South American integration have been channelled through three main 
international institutions. They are Mercosur, CAN and more recently the South American 
Community of Nations (In Spanish, CSN or CASA).10 
 
As we shall see, the first two are right in the middle of a process of metamorphosis and the third has 
not yet defined itself. In reality, it is only natural for any process of deep integration to be in a 
constant process of change. These are not linear trajectories. To the contrary, European integration 
has proven that these processes stagnate, sometimes suffer setbacks and also take periodic steps 
forward. It seems the point of no return is always avoided. 
 
Meanwhile there are also links that connect these three institutions. From these there might emerge 
some day a fledgling institutional network of South American integration.11 A first connecting link 
stems from an economic complementation accord signed in 2005 by the countries of the CSN and 
those of Mercosur, within the institutional framework of ALADI. The second is the Initiative for 
Integration of South American Regional Infrastructure (IIRSA in Spanish), conceived as ‘a forum 
for dialogue among authorities responsible for the infrastructure of transportation, energy and 
telecommunications of the 12 South American countries’. The third is one that the CSN hopes to 
develop. It is an initiative that goes back to the South American summit held in Brasilia in 2000. 
This meeting produced an Action Plan for Physical South American Integration. Technical and 
financial support were requested from the InterAmerican Development Bank, the Andean 
Development Corporation (CAF in Spanish), and the Financial Fund for the Development of the 
River Plate Basin (FONPLATA in Spanish). It is the origin of the aforementioned IIRSA. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
6 Information at www.mercosur.int. Various analyses of Mercosur at www.redmercosur.org.uy; www.sice.oas.org, and 
www.felixpena.com.ar. 
7 Information on Mexico’s strategy towards external insertion and its international trade negotiations at 
www.economia.gob.mx/index.jsp?P=863.  
8 Among other sources on ALENA-NAFTA, the web page of Mexico’s Economic Secretariat: www.nafta-mexico.org 
9 Information on Chile’s strategy towards external insertion and its international trade negotiations at www.direcon.cl. 
10 Information on the CSN, its antecedents and recent summits at www.cumbresudamericana.bo/armado.htm and also 
www.wikipedia.org. 
11 In 2006 the Secretariats of ALADI, CAN and Mercosur carried out intense work on identifying the various points of 
convergence among the different agreements and tools of trade integration, www.aladi.org. 
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La CSN was institutionalised at the political level in the Cuzco Summit in 2005. It has not yet been 
formalised in an international treaty. The last South American summit was held in Cochabamba in 
November 2006. From it there emerged a work agenda, a principle of institutionalization and the 
political decision to prepare a constituent accord that would formalize its existence, goals and areas 
of jurisdiction. For the time being it has technical support from the old Palacio Itamaraty in Rio de 
Janeiro. 
 
We believe it is not an exaggeration to say that whatever happens in the next few years in the area 
of deep integration in South America –especially if it is conceived with criteria that favour the 
diversity of external options that each country has and the flexibility of operational instruments– 
will determine to a large extent the achievement or not of the broad goals of regional integration 
that the countries of Latin America have sought for at least five decades.12 For this reason we have 
chosen this forum for concentrating on analysis on this issue. 
 
We will focus our analysis of what is happening and what might be expected to happen in the future 
with Mercosur. We choose Mercosur because of the importance of its relative economic dimension 
and power –determined to a large extent by the presence of Brazil but also Argentina– and because 
of the fact that at its inception MERCOSUR was perceived as the nucleus of South American 
integration. It might still fulfil that role. 
 
Chile’s special relationship with Mercosur, Venezuela’s recent incorporation into the organisation, 
the probability that Bolivia will follow suit and the possibility that Ecuador will do so turn this 
integration process into a key piece of the increasingly complex South American jigsaw puzzle. 
 
We will now examine factors that influenced the construction of Mercosur and the processes of 
change currently observed within it; then we will look at its insertion into the broader South 
American scheme and its prospects for the future. Finally, we will draw some conclusions. 
 
Rather than carry out a detailed analysis of the status of each of the integration aspects we will 
explore, our idea is to provide some elements that allow one to decode processes that tend to be 
hard to difficult to understand, drawing particularly on the experience accumulated with European 
integration. 
 
Mercosur’s Erratic Trajectory: Some Features for Understanding its Current Problems 
 
Mercosur was conceived as a voluntary association of sovereign, neighbouring states. Its goal is to 
achieve a process of integration that aims to be permanent. It is an alliance with projection over the 
long term. Over time it can only be sustained if members perceive more benefits in remaining than 
in withdrawing from the organisation. Just as no one forced them to join up, no one can force them 
to keep being a member if they reach the conclusion that this is what best serves their national 
interests. That is to say, if they feel they have realistic alternatives to continued membership. And 
these differ depending on the member country under consideration. To sum things up, it is a process 
based on all the members perceiving there is a dynamic framework of mutual gains and opportunity 
costs compared to other alternatives. 
 
Mercosur was created in the context of a world just beginning the post-Cold War era and a 
hemispheric scenario marked by then-President George Bush’s launching in June 1990 of the so-
called Initiative for the Americas. This gave rise at the Summit of the Americas in Miami in 1994 to 
the start of negotiations for establishing the Free Trade Area of the Americas (ALCA in Spanish), 
                                                 
12 Félix Peña, Moments and Perspectives: Argentina in the World and Latin America, Buenos Aires 2003. Includes 
precedents and bibliographical sources on different stages of Latin American integration. 
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which entered into decline after the Mar del Plata summit in 2005 en Mar del Plata. 
 
Although the concrete commitments undertaken at Mercosur’s founding were mainly economic –
we could even say commercial– from the outset the organisation has had a strong political 
component. This referred to the consolidation of democracy, an increase in each country’s capacity 
to attract productive investments –in function of the expanded market but also as a springboard for 
operating in other countries, especially in the South American region– and the idea of jointly 
negotiating trade advantages with third countries, especially the US and the EU. It is worth 
recalling that the decision to form Mercosur was adopted by Argentina and Brazil at a bilateral, 
presidential summit in July 1990, just weeks after Bush unveiled his own initiative. 
 
Even though Uruguay and Paraguay later joined up –Chile was invited to do so but preferred not to 
participate as a full-fledged member– the idea of creating MERCOSUR was an initiative of 
Argentina and Brazil, as a follow-up to the process of bilateral integration they started in 1986. In 
1988 they even signed a bilateral treaty, which remains in force. And today it is in the bilateral 
realm where some of the most important economic activities are channelled, such as the automobile 
industry. 
 
From the outset the process was imagined as one of gradual development, in which each step 
should pave the way for and determine the ones to follow. For this reason the Treaty of Asunción 
was so schematic –24 articles and three annexes–. More than prudence, this reflected the internal, 
political and economic uncertainties that existed in the main members. At the beginning of the last 
decade, these countries had not finished digesting years of military government or even the severe 
macro-economic problems of the previous decade. It also reflected the countries’ lack of experience 
with automatic mechanisms of trade deregulation (the idea of zero duties across the range of 
products that had carried tariffs) and then with a common external tariff. These two were the main 
operational tools to which the countries committed when they founded Mercosur. 
 
The first phase of building Mercosur was the so-called period of transition, which culminated in 
December 1994 in the summit of Ouro Preto. The second phase was the installation of the customs 
union, with the implementation of a common external tariff. This phase has not been totally 
completed. At the same time a phase of deep integration was supposed to have begun, focusing on 
two principles: macroeconomic coordination and joint productive transformation. Besides a lot of 
announcements and some measures designed to take Mercosur into this much more complex phase, 
very little progress has been made so far in this area. 
 
Three features have marked the evolution of Mercosur from its inception. They are still present and 
to some extent help explain the difficulties that have emerged, especially in recent years, in the 
construction of Mercosur and the addressing of the phase of deep integration. These features are the 
asymmetry of the members, the relatively low level of interdependence among them and their 
reluctance to accept collective discipline, especially on the part of countries with larger economies. 
As for the asymmetries, the main ones are the relative economic dimensions and power, and the 
different degrees of development. On this level the differences among the members are acute, with 
Brazil at one extreme and Paraguay and Uruguay at the other. There are also differences in the 
degrees of relevance –and therefore of necessity– that the respective markets have for each of the 
members, and their options through their respective insertion in global markets. The very 
perception of Mercosur, its raison d’etre and the way of building it depend on the relative 
dimension of each country. Another thing that varies is the density of created interests, as seen in 
particular in the area of productive integration. 
 
Although this is a factor observed in other regions with different kinds of integration processes –
like those in North America or Europe– something that sets Mercosur apart is that no country, not 
even Brazil, is in a position to play the role of engine leading the development of the rest, much less 
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financial partner. Nor has there been observed in the case of Mercosur the presence of a major 
power bent on stimulating the process of integration for reasons linked to their security agenda, 
such as the role played by the US at the start of European integration. The ambivalence of the US 
with regard to the strategic idea of Mercosur and the difficulties that have prevented formalizing the 
strategic alliance with the European Union reflect the absence of an external energising force for the 
region. 
 
The question of asymmetries has become a central issue on the current agenda of Mercosur.13 This 
is because Paraguay and Uruguay, the two countries with the weakest economies –and lowest level 
of development in the case of Paraguay–, feel that such as it is, Mercosur does not suit them. 
Although this is a problem that stems from economic data, it has become one of the main political 
problems for Mercosur. 
 
The low grade of interdependence among the members –the second of the three features that have 
marked Mercosur– manifests itself in particular in trade and investment flows. They continue to be 
relatively insignificant compared with those that link each country with the rest of the world. Brazil 
is a case in point. In 1990, its exports to the other three members of Mercosur totalled just a little 
over 4 % of its total exports. By 1998 this figure has risen to 17 %. After the crisis of 1999-2002, in 
2006 the export figure was a little over 10%. In the case of the other members, in 2006 the 
proportion of their exports to Mercosur compared to the total were 20% for Argentina, 45% for 
Paraguay and 23% for Uruguay. In the area of direct investments, in the past few years an increase 
has been observed in those coming from Brazil, but these investments are still less than those made 
by countries of the OECD. 
 
The importance that Mercosur holds for the four founding members grows when viewed from a 
political perspective –we note their living in a contiguous context–; the effects of showing that the 
respective internal political processes have for the other members, and relevance in foreign policies 
in the face of the US and other countries, among other factors. It is also seen in macroeconomic 
policies –sensitivity to phenomena such as those triggered by recessions or currency crises; in trade 
in industrial products and in capacity to attract productive investments, especially those stemming 
from large multinational networks of production of goods and rendering of services. But even in 
such cases one observes differential effects stemming from the asymmetries mentioned before. For 
instance, the dominant perception in Paraguay and Uruguay is that in some of those areas –mainly 
in trade in manufactured products and capacity for luring direct investments from abroad– Mercosur 
has essentially benefited Brazil, but also Argentina. 
 
The third feature –members’ reluctance to accept collective discipline– leads to a tendency toward 
scare compliance with common rules that have been agreed and to preserve as much as possible a 
wide margin for unilateral action. This is seen most with Argentina and Brazil, but examples also 
abound in Uruguay and Paraguay. 
 
This trend can be attributed to multiple factors. Some are cultural, such as a deficient tradition of 
playing by the rules in the countries themselves; this lack of respect for rules is not something 
characteristic of Argentina only. There is also a preference for precarious rules of play in regional 
integration links, something that was observed in the period of the ALALC and even that of the 
ALADI. Another factor is resistance, especially by Argentina and Brazil, to transferring effective 
jurisdiction to common bodies that lack integration and firm inter-governmental control. 
 
Other factors reflect effects of the integration methodologies that have been used. Two aspects in 
particular are worth pointing out. In the first place, the processes of establishing rules have centred 
                                                 
13 On the issue of asymmetries and other relevant themes on the agenda of Mercosur from the second half of 2005 and 
first half of 2006, see Informe Mercosur, nr 11, published by INTAL-BID, January 2007, at www.iadb.org/intal. 
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on participation by foreign affairs ministries, and only in an erratic and marginal way has weight 
been given to finance ministries or their equivalents. This has yielded rules of play with low 
potential for being effective –having capacity to penetrate into every day life– and also for being 
efficient –having capacity for producing the results that were expected–. For a long time the rules 
agreed did not fully take effect –they have not been incorporated into countries’ domestic 
legislation–. And there has been a tendency toward predominance of ‘diplomacy through the media’ 
and ‘special effects’, especially in the periodic presidential summits.  In second place we note a 
very low transparency in this process of establishing rules and the very rules that result from these 
processes. It is interesting to compare the official web page of Mercosur with that of other, similar 
processes, especially that of the EU, but also within the region, such as the web site of the CAN. 
 
This insufficient transparency might be a factor that explains the scant participation of civil society 
in the process of integration. This weak transparency and citizen participation –and by organized 
social interests– can be observed in the multinational standing of Mercosur institutions but it also 
manifests itself domestically in each member country, even though within this level there exist 
acute differences among said countries. 
 
Mercosur’s Metamorphosis: Will it be Able to Adapt to New Global and Regional Realities? 
 
Sixteen years after its creation, Mercosur boasts a mixed record of successes and shortcomings as 
far as its achievements are concerned. 
 
On the one hand, some of its achievements include the following: 
 
• It is a relevant part of the policies of external insertion of the respective countries. Governments 
maintain political will to keep building it. This is still seen in cases such as those of Paraguay 
and Uruguay, which recently have adopted a critical attitude with regard to its results. The 
dominant feeling seems to be that there are no reasonable alternatives to the current process of 
integration. 
 
• Its geographic expanse has spread through a network of preferential accords reached with other 
countries of the ALADI, many of which have the status of associate members. In 2006 
Venezuela became a full member following its withdrawal from the CAN, although the 
formalisation of its joining has not been completed. Brazil and Paraguay –pending approval by 
their legislatures– still need to pass the membership protocol signed in Caracas. At the last half-
year summit held in Rio de Janeiro in January 2007, it was agreed to open a process aimed at 
incorporating Bolivia as a full member of Mercosur. 
 
• A significant part of trade within Mercosur is free of import duties, but this feat is undermined if 
one takes into account non-tariff restrictions and other trade barriers that remain in force. Nor 
has the bloc managed to articulate a system of escape valves for situations of economic 
emergency or sector-specific difficulties.14 
 
• The common external tariff exists and is applied. But there are still exceptions to this, both legal 
and de facto. 
 
• Direct investment among the member countries –including in many cases Chile– has grown in 
recent years, as have those stemming from multinational networks of production of goods and 
services, many depending on the integrated market, as is the case of the automobile sector. A 
significant part of those investments have gone to Brazil, taking advantage of the greater size of 
                                                 
14 Only one mechanism of competitive adaptation has been established at the bilateral level between Argentina and 
Brazil. 
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the domestic market and the security of having access to the markets of other member countries, 
in particular Argentina,15 or they have originated in companies from Brazil and Chile. 
 
• Transport channels –especially by land– and the physical distribution of goods have developed, 
improving connections between urban markets. This is especially the case in the string of large 
cities stretching from Belo Horizonte, to Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in the north, and 
Asunción-Montevideo-Buenos Aires-Rosario-Córdoba-Mendoza-Santiago de Chile and 
Valparaíso in the south. These large cities hold the largest capacity for consumption, production 
of industrial goods and rendering of services in all Mercosur. 
 
• There is an institutional structure which, besides the intergovernmental bodies that date from the 
founding of Mercosur and have given rise to a dense network of technical agencies –recent 
additions include the Mercosur Parliament and the Commission of Permanent Representatives, 
with its presidency– includes a fledgling Secretariat and an arbitration mechanism, which has 
improved somewhat after the approval of the Olivos Protocol. 
 
• Mercosur has developed a strong fabric of social networks that are active in areas including 
trade unions, culture and education. 
 
On the other hand there are significant shortcomings in the construction of Mercosur. Some of the 
main ones are seen in these areas: 
 
• The identity of the integration process. This has to do with the definition of why and for what 
the member countries have decided to work together. Sometimes it is hard to answer the 
question of what exactly Mercosur is. Said another way, the answers can vary depending on 
each national perspective, and even within political and social sectors of each country. The 
range of answers depends on the emphasis that is placed on political goals and content on one 
hand and on economic and trade-related ones on the other. The incorporation of Venezuela 
seems to have deepened dissonance in both realms. Caracas tends to see Mercosur as a mainly 
political project associated with the idea of a Bolivarian Fatherland. This does not always sit 
well with public opinion in other countries, especially that of Brazil, which for historical 
reasons is more distant from the Bolivarian tradition. Venezuela also sees Mercosur as a tool for 
opposing what it sees as U.S. hegemonic aims. In the original member countries, although this 
vision is not necessarily shared, even by governments, it is still considered necessary to go 
beyond a conception of Mercosur that overly stresses trade issues. This conception is considered 
a reflection of the economic approaches that predominated in the 1990s. 
 
• The efficiency of its institutional mechanisms. This has to do with the issue of how the 
members should work together. The process of elaborating regulations at Mercosur has yielded 
a load of rules of play, many of which lack effectiveness and therefore they lack efficiency. In 
particular, from the point of view of those who have to make decisions on productive 
investment, many rules are just not credible. Specifically, they do not allow companies to 
operate in the Mercosur economic space as if it were a single market. Many questions have not 
been resolved. They include ones that are crucial for the idea of customs union –a backbone in 
the creation of Mercosur in the commitments that countries have been making, such as the 
Common Customs Code–. Other measures that were formally adopted never came into effect, 
such as the rules for defending competition, or rules for government policy that affect economic 
competition within the integrated economic space, including tax incentives for trade and 
investment. Furthermore, there has been no advancement in macroeconomic coordination. Nor 
                                                 
15 The fact that the Constitution of Argentina stipulates that international treaties take precedent over domestic 
legislation causes a legal rigidity that is seen with the same scope in Brazil. This is one of the most significant 
asymmetries within Mercosur. 
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has there been significant progress in productive integration. These two failures have aggravated 
the feeling that there is a lack of efficiency in the mechanisms for harmonising national interests 
and elaboration of regulations in the Mercosur sphere. 
 
• Its relevance and how attractive it is for each member country. One observes the paradox that, 
on one hand, membership has grown while on the other there is a growing problem of social 
legitimacy. This is reflected in the business sectors of some countries –Brazil is one of the most 
prominent cases– and also those with less relative economic weight, such as Paraguay and 
Uruguay. One hears and reads the expression ‘such as it is, it does not work for us’, in the four 
founding members. But this has also been observed in Venezuelan business sectors, which have 
not hid their dissatisfaction over not being consulted over the decisions to quit the Community 
of Andean Nations or join Mercosur as a fully-fledged member. 
 
This panorama of mixed results is reflected in an intense debate over Mercosur in the member 
countries, and is expressed often in the news media. The result of this is that citizens, investors and 
third countries are more and more perplexed over Mercosur and its future. 
 
It can be argued that Mercosur is the middle of a process of change. The combination of factors that 
affect the opinions of the member countries allow one to anticipate a metamorphosis of the original 
project rather than a formal failure of the process of integration. However, the Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez has been more vehement in his repeated public statements to the effect that if 
Mercosur does not undergo a deep transformation or it will fail in the same way he considers the 
CAN to have failed. His proposals for reforms are not known, at least not publicly, nor how he 
plans to achieve the necessary consensus among all the members. 
 
In fact, this metamorphosis has already begun. Its origin may have been the crisis unleashed by the 
devaluation of the Brazilian Real currency in 1999 and then the economic collapse of Argentina in 
2001. The transformation centres on major questions that are now high on the agenda of Mercosur. 
 
While there are others, the main ones seem to be: 
 
• Addressing asymmetries among members, especially those that affect Paraguay and Uruguay, 
including development of the Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEM in Spanish), the first pilot 
projects of which were approved at the Mercosur Council meeting in Rio de Janeiro in January 
2007. 
 
• Developing the idea of a customs union and joint productive transformation. 
 
• Strengthening Mercosur institutions. 
 
• Joint, external trade negotiations by the bloc and eventually by each one of its members.16 
 
In order to understand better some of the factors influencing the metamorphosis of Mercosur and 
evaluate its prospects, it is convenient to consider this process within the dynamics of change that 
are being observed in South America. 
 
Mercosur’s Place in the Dynamics of Change in South America and its Future Prospects 
 
The links between the space that Mercosur encompasses and the South American regional sphere 
                                                 
16 An issue that will be a priority in Mercosur is consensus among member countries on whatever commitments are 
made at the Doha round of talks at the World Trade Organisation, taking into account the existence of the common 
external tariff. 
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vary depending on the geographic perspective from which the links are observed.   
 
When it was founded, Mercosur was perceived as a project addressing what was traditionally 
known as the Southern Cone –the original name of the project was the Common Market of the 
Southern Cone, from which Mercosur is taken–. 
 
That perception was even present in the initial stages of the ALALC before the initiative launched 
by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile spread to the Andean countries and also to Mexico. Even 
many earlier proposals for regional integration referred to the countries of the Southern Cone.  
 
The Andean Group emerged in the 1960s –at first through an initiative of presidents Frei of Chile 
and Lleras Restrepo of Colombia–,as a reaction by some Andean countries to what they saw as 
excessive influence by Argentina and Brazil in the affairs of the ALALC. Meanwhile, Argentina 
came to foresee itself linking up with the Andean Group and in particular with Venezuela as a way 
to counter the growing influence of Brazil in regional affairs. This was most clear during the last 
Perón presidency in the 1970s. It was then that, through an initiative by Venezuela and Mexico, the 
Latin American Economic System (SELA)17 was created. This forum gradually lost the relevance it 
had at the outset. 
 
Ever since Mercosur was created, Brazil felt strongly that the project could not be construed –even 
for domestic reasons– as being linked solely to the Southern Cone. For this reason in the final 
stages of the negotiation of the Treaty of Asunción, the word ‘cone’ was deleted and the official 
name ended up as Common Market of the South. 
 
It is only natural for Brazil to push for integration throughout South America. Its geographic 
insertion explains this. So it comes as no surprise that the initiative that began at the Brasilia 
summit of 2000, the path that has led to the idea of the CSN, had strong support from Brazil. 
Another precedent was the Treaty for Amazon Cooperation. 
 
This trend toward addressing South American –as opposed to Latin American– integration has 
grown in recent years as a result of two factors. 
 
In the first place, from Brazil’s natural perspective, the axes of physical integration have both a 
southward projection, in the area of the River Plate basin, and an Atlantic-Pacific projection 
through inter-oceanic link-up projects, especially through Bolivia and Peru. 
 
Secondly, access to sources of hydrocarbons has grown in importance in several countries of South 
America, especially energy from Bolivia and Venezuela. 
 
If we add to this geopolitical factors, especially those linked to the region’s political stability and 
even to the security agendas of the various countries, and the importance of preserving preferential 
access to the markets of the Andean countries, it is easy to understand how the Mercosur and CAN 
spheres have gradually been integrated into the perspective of regional policies, not just those of 
Brazil, but also Argentina, Chile and the Andean countries, including Venezuela. 
 
For this reason, even since Mercosur was created, its links with what was to be the CAN as of 1997 
have had a special priority. This has been reflected in the status of associate Mercosur members that 
the Andean countries gradually acquired, and then the aforementioned economic complementation 
accord reached in 2005 within the framework of ALADI. 
 
One factor that is speeding up the processes of change within Mercosur and CAN has to do with 
                                                 
17 For information on SELA and its activities, see the official Web page: www.sela.org. 
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various countries’ interest in reaching free trade accords with the US. After those achieved by 
Mexico and Chile, and the countries of Central America and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-
RD), Colombia and Peru concluded their negotiations with Washington. These last two accords still 
need approval from the US Congress. Within Mercosur Uruguay has said that within the issue of 
asymmetries it needs authorisation to carry out negotiations for preferential trade terms with third 
countries, including the US. In December 2006 Uruguay and the US signed a framework agreement 
on trade and investment (TIFA) that includes the prospect of reaching a free trade accord. The 
accord established a consultation mechanism very similar to the one the four original Mercosur 
countries reached with the US in 1991, known as ‘4+1’.18 The current rules of Mercosur stipulate 
that trade accords that include tariff advantages with third countries must be negotiated jointly 
among all the member countries. Both Brazil and Argentina say that a free trade accord between 
Uruguay and the US would be incompatible with Mercosur’s customs union and common external 
tariff. 
 
The fact that relevant questions on the political, economic and national security agendas of the 
countries of the region can only be addressed at the entire South American level helps explain the 
momentum that the idea of the CSN has taken on. 
 
However, it remains unclear how the three main regional integration institutions of South America 
will work together in the future. 
 
Several scenarios are possible. Some of them are: 
 
• Co-existence of the current institutions (CSN, Mercosur, CAN) with links among them, 
especially through the network of preferential trade agreements under ALADI. But there would 
be greater flexibility in Mercosur’s rules –those of the CAN have already been made more 
flexible– with regard to the possibility of member states reaching preferential trade accords with 
non-Latin American countries, be this in a bilateral way or as the result of framework accords 
that call for common rules and regulations, although with differentiated preferential treatments. 
To some extent, one can view as precedents for this the agreement between Mercosur and 
Mexico, and the aforementioned economic complementation agreement between Mercosur and 
CAN. 
 
• Evolution of CSN into a common institutional framework for South America that absorbs both 
Mercosur and the CAN, and also constitutes an entity for driving physical and energy-related 
integration, among other issues of common interest. 
 
• Consolidation of Mercosur as the core of South American integration through the incorporation 
of other countries of the CAN as full-fledged members and an easing of differences that exist 
between full and associate members. This would involve deepening reforms of Mercosur’s 
current mechanisms and rules –especially with regard to the customs union– in order to make 
them more flexible and adapted to an architecture of integration that has variable geometry and 
multiple speeds. 
 
It is hard to say which of the three scenarios will prevail. It is most likely that for now, all three 
options –or others that are conceivable or hard to imagine now– will remain open. In any case, it 
seems reasonable to expect that in the next few years one will observe a trend toward South 
America differentiating itself from the rest of Latin America –due to a large extent by the issue of 
geography– and toward a multiplicity of institutions through which integration efforts are 
                                                 
18 Signed in June 1991 in Washington. It is also known as the Rose Garden Agreement. It remains in force, but its 
Council has not convened since 2002. Now that Venezuela has joined Mercosur, it does not seem likely that this forum 
for consultation will be reactivated for now. 
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channelled. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
The following are some tentative conclusions to be drawn from our analysis: 
 
• For the foreseeable future, Latin American integration will continue to be influenced by the 
processes of deep transformation observed in the international system and by growing 
uncertainty on the world stage. 
 
• It is possible that a trend toward what is known as open regionalism will intensify. In this kind 
of regionalism, countries seek to reach alliances at the regional and sub-regional level, while 
pursuing strategies of multipolar insertion in the global economy, taking maximum advantage 
of the World Trade Organisation and the possibility of using that forum to reach preferential 
trade agreements. 
 
• This will accentuate the search for links to connect institutions working toward regional 
integration, especially in South America, through heterodox methodologies of variable 
geometry and multiple speeds. 
 
• In the near future, the multiplicity of regional integration institutions will continue to be a part 
of both the Latin American situation (in which ALADI could play an important role, especially 
but not exclusively in the area of preferential trade) and the South American one (in which the 
CSN, depending on the final format it takes on, could play a relevant role). 
 
• In South America, sub-region institutions (CAN and Mercosur) will continue to be important 
but probably just to the extent that that they enhance their ongoing processes of adapting to 
regional and global realities. Otherwise, their drift toward irrelevance could be irreversible. This 
would involve achieving an adequate combination of making their tools and rules more flexible 
and above all acceptance by all members of a minimum of collective discipline that they are all 
actually prepared to respect. 
 
• Energy and integration of physical infrastructure will continue to be an important part of 
integration strategies. 
 
• It will be difficult for South America to make substantial progress toward deep integration, at 
least along the lines of the model developed with European integration. It is worth keeping in 
mind that in the future the European Union will probably enhance its evolution toward a 
structure of variable geometry and multiple speeds in order to deal with the diversity it has 
acquired with its continuing enlargement. 
 
• On the other hand, it is probable that influence from the Asian model of multipolar regional 
integration will increase. It is one open to insertion in all areas of the global economy. 
 
South America’s capacity for creating a mentality dominated by the logic of integration will 
depend on its ability to neutralise many factors of fragmentation that have begun to emerge in 
the region in recent years. 
 
To a large extent, whether or not this happens will depend on the strengthening of a core of 
countries with democratic regimes and national strategies that seek to harvest all the 
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opportunities provided by globalisation of the international system and international economic 
competition. 
 
• It will also depend on the prudence and strategic vision that South America shows in its relations 
with Latin America and the countries of South America itself, and with major powers with 
significant interests in the region –currently or potentially– in particular the US, the countries of 
the EU and China. 
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